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PROPERTY
I.

ZONING

Nuckles v. Allen,' one of the most interesting property cases
decided during the survey period, presented administrative as
well as property questions. The case involved a controversy
between petitioning property owners and the Board of Adjustment, an administrative body set up under the Zoning
Ordinance of the City of Myrtle Beach, over the right to
build a motel on petitioners' property. The property was
designated "R-1 - Single Family Residences." The zoning
ordinance, however, granted the authority to designate certain
lots within the "R-1" areas as "A" lots upon which motels
could be built if, in the opinion of the board, such use would
not be detrimental to other property in the section. The lots
in question were "A" lots.
Several of the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as McLeod) entered into a contract of sale to purchase the lots,
subject to an exception being granted.2 McLeod prepared plot
plans for several motels and submitted them to the Board of
Adjustment, along with details of his proposed purchase, and
asked for positive assurance of the right to so use the
property. The exception was granted, and based upon this
approval, the purchase was consummated.
Thereafter, McLeod contracted to sell petitioner Nuckles
two of the "A" lots, with an option to buy a third. The sale
was subject to the contingency that a building permit for
a motel be issued immediately and that no action for an injunction against the building of a motel be taken. The building inspector issued a building permit to Nuckles for the
construction of the motel, but two days later, and before
Nuckles had expended money in reliance upon it, the board
revoked the permit and rescinded the exception originally
granted to McLeod.
1. 250 S.C. 123, 156 S.E.2d 633 (1967).
2. The South Carolina Supreme Court did not distinguish between a
variance and an exception but referred to the relief granted as a "variance
or exception." Since, however, the terms of possible relief were set out in
the zoning ordinance itself, it would appear that here the court was dealing
with an exception rather than a variance, which is normally granted to
modify zoning restrictions which have become burdensome but which provide no terms for relief.
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The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized two questions which may be thus presented: (1) Could the Board of
Adjustment revoke an exception granted with knowledge of
a contract of sale, contingent upon that exception being
granted, after the exception has been relied on to the extent
that the transfer of the property was carried out? (2) Could
the Board revoke a building permit issued to a subsequent
purchaser of the property upon which the exception had
been granted?
In first considering the question of the revocation of the
exception the court looked to two South Carolina cases involving building permits, Willis v. Town of Woodruff3 and
Pendleton v. City Council of Columbia.4 Willis enunciated
the principle that when a permit for the erection of a structure has been granted by the proper authorities and when
liabilities have been incurred thereon, a property right in
the permit vests. Once created, such a right cannot be revoked without cause or absent public necessity. On the basis
of this principle, the Nuckles court held that McLeod had
acquired a vested property right to the exception when he
purchased in reliance thereon, and that the Board had no
right to revoke this right without cause or in the absence
of public necessity.
With regard to the second question concerning the revocation of the building permit, the court held that since McLeod
had a vested property right to use the property for motel purposes, that right inured to the benefit of the land and also
to the benefit of Nuckles, the subsequent purchaser. One
issue which was not raised but may have had bearing on the
case was that of the constitutionality 5 of the provisions in the
Zoning Ordinance of Myrtle Beach which allowed the designation of certain of the lots in the "R-I" district as "A"
lots upon which an exception might be granted, while there
were no provisions for exceptions upon the remainder of the
lots in the "R-I" district.
3. 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E.2d 699 (1942).

4. 209 S.C. 394, 40 S.E.2d 499 (1946).
5. Normally when an exception is provided for in a zoning ordinance it

covers the whole area involved; however, here the exception could only be
granted on specific lots designated in the zoning area. It might be argued
that this designation was arbitrary and constituted "spot zoning;" however, this writer was unable to find precedent involving facts similar to
those here presented in which this argument was used.
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Palmetto Petroleum, Inc. v. City of Mullins0 also involved
the validity of the transfer of a building permit. Here the
building inspector for the City of Mullins issued to one White
a permit to build an automobile service station. White incurred no obligation in reliance upon the permit but thereafter
sold the property to Palmetto Petroleum, Inc., which assumed
that it could take advantage of the permit. Palmetto expended about $400.00 in reliance on that assumption.
The court held that the permit was never more than a
personal privilege held by White. When White sold the
property without exercising that right, the building permit
became a nullity and Palmetto Petroleum had no right to
rely on it. Appellant, Palmetto Petroleum, cited Nuckles v.
Allen,'7 but the court properly distinguished Nuckles from
the present situation. In Nuckles the recipient of the exception had made considerable expenditures in justified reliance
upon it, while here White failed to rely on the permit at all,
and it did not become a vested property right and was not
transferable.
II. CONTRACT AND TORT
On appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the
complaint in Rogers v. Scyphers our court considered two
questions of novel impression in this jurisdiction: (1) Is a
party who is engaged in the business of building and selling
new dwelling houses liable to the purchaser or invitees9 of
the purchaser for personal injuries sustained as a result of
defective construction caused by the builder's negligence?
(2) Is such builder-seller of a new house liable for such
injuries if he negligently or wilfully fails to disclose dangerously defective construction, of which he either knew or,
in the exercise of due care, should have known?
The defendant was engaged in the construction of houses
and sold one of them to the plaintiff's husband. While the
house was relatively new, the plaintiff, who was pregnant
6. 159 S.E.2d 854 (S.C. 1968).
7. 250 S.C. 123, 156 S.E.2d 633 (1967).
8. 161 S.E.2d 81 (S.C. 1968).
9. The court referred to the wife of the purchaser as an invitee of the
purchaser throughout the case in a possible attempt to broaden the holding. Since the injured party was an immediate member of the purchaser's
family, rather than an invitee, the holding of this case is narrower than
the words of the opinion would suggest.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

3

646

South
Carolina
Law Review,
20, Iss. 4 [2020],
Art. 920
[Vol.
REVIEW
LAW Vol.
CAROLINA
SOUTH

at the time, was seriously injured when a folding stairway
to the attic fell from under her. The plaintiff's complaint
alleged negligence, and the demurrer of the defendants raised
the above stated questions.
The court realized the seriousness of these questions because of the increasing volume of construction of homes for
sale to individuals. In overruling the demurrer the court
relied on the rationale of Salladin v. Tellis 0 and of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."' and decided that there was no rational difference between the duty owed by the manufacturer
of a chattel and the duty owed by the builder-vendor of a
new structure. The court said:
We think there was a duty on the defendants as
builders to use reasonable care in the construction of
the home to avoid unreasonable risk and danger to
those who would normally be expected to occupy it,
and a duty to disclose to the purchaser any dangerous
condition of which they knew or should have known,
in the exercise of reasonable care. Such were duties
owed by them, not only to the purchaser, but to members of his family whom they, of course, should have
known would likely be injured by the dangerous condition. 12
The court rejected the old rule, 13 that the grantor of real
estate is not liable for injuries to a purchaser or members
of his family resulting from an existing defective condition
of the premises conveyed, in cases where the house is a new
one, built by the vendor or for the vendor 1 4
10. 247 S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d 875 (1966).

11. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
12. 161 S.E.2d at 84.
13. See Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 446 (1961).

14. Although mentioned only as one of a number of cases that generally
supported this court's position, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,
207 A.2d 314 (1965), very strongly suggested abrogation of the privity
requirement in a situation similar to that in the instant case on both the
theory of negligence and that of implied warranty. In Schipper, the plaintiff, lessee of the original buyer of the house, sued the builder-vendor who
was a mass developer of homes. The builder installed a water heater on
which there was no means of regulating the temperature of the water,
and a child of the lessee was severely burned by the scalding water. The
New Jersey court reversed a dismissal and remanded the cause for trial
stating that the facts constituted a cause of action under both the theory
of negligence and the theory of implied warranty.
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Frasher v. Cofer i 5 presented an interesting contrast to
Rogers. The plaintiff in Frasherproceeded under the theory
of implied warranty to recover damages for a defective heating system which was a part of the house that the defendant-builder sold to the plaintiff. The court quoted from
Lessly v. Bowie 6 the principle that "[iln a sale of lands
there is certainly no implied warranty, as there may be in
reference to personalty. . . .A purchaser must protect himself, if at all, by covenants in writing, out of which all his
rights of defence must come, except, perhaps, in the case
' 17
of fraud.
In addition to the case of fraud the court hinted that there
might be liability when the house is new, built by the vendor,
sold shortly after completion, and the defective condition
was one of which the vendor knew or should have known,
and of which the vendee did not know or have reason to
know. Unfortunately, the complaint was insufficient to state
a cause of action under either theory. It seems certain, however, that in light of dicta in Rogers and of statements in
Frasher, the court will impose liability on the theory of
implied warranty if the case meets the standards set out
above.
In Lumpkin v. Allstate Insurance Co.' s the plaintiff sued
her insurance carrier for conversion of her automobile. The
plaintiff was insured by Allstate under a policy which afforded one hundred dollars deductible collision insurance.
The automobile was wrecked and taken to a body shop, where
later the shop operator gave the defendant's adjuster a repair estimate. The adjuster left with the shop operator
a draft for the amount of the repair bill, less the deductible
portion, the signing of which would constitute a full release;
and also left a separate full release, both to be signed by
the plaintiff. The defendant's agent authorized repairs and
left instructions not to deliver the car to the plaintiff before she executed the two documents. At no time did the
plaintiff expressly authorize repairs or assent to this transaction. In fact the plaintiff understandably refused to sign
the releases since prior to the accident the value of her
15. 160 S.E.2d 560 (S.C. 1968).
16. 27 S.C. 193, 3 S.E. 199 (1887).

17. Id. at 197, 3 S.E. at 200.
18. 159 S.E.2d 852 (S.C. 1968).
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automobile was about $3,000 while, according to the plaintiff,
its market value after the repairs were performed was only
$1,300.
Under the principles set forth in Campbell v. Calvert Fire
Insurance Co.' 9 the defendant's liability under a policy "to
repair or replace the property or such part thereof with
other of like kind of quality" is not limited to the amount
of the repair bill but extends to the cost of placing the automobile in the same condition that it was in prior to the
accident. It is obvious that in the present case the defendant
had not fully discharged its obligation to its insured.
The court found that the acts of the defendant in authorizing repairs and giving directions as to the retention of the
automobile constituted constructive possession, which made
the repairman the defendant's agent, and that the acts of both
constituted a conversion."
III. TAKING

In Brown v. School District of Greenville County2 ' the
plaintiff landowners sued the School District and the City of
Greenville for damages caused when surface waters were
concentrated on the plaintiffs' land. Their complaint alleged
that the school wrongfully constructed the school buildings
and grounds so that the natural flow of rain water was concentrated onto plaintiffs' property with great force and that
the city, after properly assuming maintenance of the road
between the school and the damaged property, failed to provide proper drainage. In ruling on the school's demurrer
the court quoted from Lindsay v. City of Greenville.22
When a public agency acting under authority of
statute uses land which it has lawfully acquired for
public purposes in such a way that neighboring real
estate, belonging to a private owner, is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth,
sand or other material so as effectually to destroy
19. 234 S.C. 583, 109 S.E.2d 572 (1959).
20. See, e.g., Powell v. A.K. Brown Motor Co., 200 S.C. 75, 20 S.E.2d
636 (1942).
21. 161 S.E.2d 815 (S.C. 1968).
22. 247 S.C. 232, 146 S.E.2d 863 (1966).
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or impair its usefulness, there is a taking within the
23
meaning of the constitution.

On the basis of Lindsay the court overruled the school's demurrer. With regard to the city, the court concluded that
there must have been positive action 4 on its part for statutory liability to attach. 25 Since no positive action was alleged, the city's demurrer was properly sustained by the
26
lower court.

IV. EASEMENTS
In Tyler v. Guerry27 sixty-six persons brought an action
demanding that the defendants be enjoined from interfering
with their use of two roads, both ending on the defendants'
land; and that the right of the public to use these roads be
determined.
One of the roads, known as the old road, had been used by
the local residents for more than fifty years as an access to
a river bank on defendant's land. The river bank was used,
sometimes with permission and sometimes not, for fishing,
swimming, picnicking, and occasional baptismal services. Only
one witness testified that he put a boat in at the river bank.
It did not, therefore, legally qualify as a landing. The court
held that since the road was one across the land of two
owners, ending on the land of one of them, rather than a
road connecting a public road and a public waterway, no
prescriptive easement arose.
The plaintiffs attempted to prove a dedication of the new
road, which had been in use for about ten years, by showing
that the county authorities helped with the construction of
the road. The evidence demonstrated, however, that the defendants provided the necessary labor and materials for the
road and that it was common practice for the county road
officials to assist private landowners in this manner. The
court adopted the standard set out in Seaboard Air Line
23. Id. at 238, 146 S.E.2d at 866. See also Chick Springs Water Co. v.

State Highway Dep't., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931). But see Gasque
v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940).
24. For an exainiple of "positive action," see Chick Springs Water Co.
v. State Highway Dep't., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-224 (1962).
26. Hill v. City of Greenville, 223 S.C. 392, 76 S.E.2d 294 (1953).
27. 160 S.E.2d 889 (S.C. 1968).
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RailroadCo. v. Town of Fairfax28 with respect to the quantum
of proof necessary to show a dedication. Seaboard required
that the proof must be strict, cogent and convincing and that
the acts proved must not be consistent with any construction
other than that of a dedication. The court held that a higher
degree of proof than by the preponderance of the evidence
was required and that the plaintiffs did not meet that
standard.
While primarily involving procedural questions, Marshall V.
Winter 29 was a case in which an abutting property owner
sought damages for the defendant's interfering with his
right to use an abandoned public highway as a means of ingress and egress. Under the principles expressed in Taylor
v. Cox, 0 title remains vested to the center of the road in
abutting property owners, and when the road is a way of
necessity, the easement in the remaining half of the road is
not extinquished. Thus, it would seem that when a public
road is abandoned, the abutting property owners have an
easement in the road as a means of ingress and egress when
the road is necessary to the use of the property owner's land.
V. DEEDS AND GRANTS
Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas31 was a very interesting case
involving a dispute over the quantum of estate conveyed by
a deed, which in the familiar language of such instruments,
provided in part:
I, T. C. Hammond in the State aforesaid, Aiken
County, in consideration of the sum of Eighty &
No/100 Dollars to me paid by Tom McCain, James
Smith, & William Hammond as Trustee of Carys Hill
School in the State aforesaid Edgefield County have
granted, bargained, sold and released, and by these
presents do grant, bargain, sell and release unto the
said Tom McCain, James Smith and William Hammond, their successors and assigns, All that lot or
parcel of land in the State & County above named
containing Four (4) acres and bounded East, North
28.
29.
80.
31.

80 S.C. 414, 61 S.E. 950 (1908).
250 S.C. 308, 157 S.E.2d 595 (1967).
218 S.C. 488, 63 S.E.2d 470 (1951).
159 S.E.2d 46 (S.C. 1968).
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& West by lands of the Grantor (T. C. Hammond)
and South by lands of H. W. McKie.
It is specifically understood and agreed by all parties
that the land is to be used for school purposes only should it ever be used for other purposes the said
property is to be revert [sic] to him the said T.C.
Hammond or his heirs and assigns forever.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the
premises before mentioned unto the said Tom McCain, James Smith and William Hammond, their
successors and assigns forever.
The plaintiff acquired the property through a long chain
of conveyances from the above grantees, and the defendant
claimed as assignee of the grantor's alleged reversionary
interest. 32 The issue, as stipulated by the parties, was whether

or not subsequent words in the same instrument could limit
a fee simple estate previously established in the granting
clause. The court, citing numerous cases as precedent, stated
that when the granting clause in a deed purports to convey
title in fee simple absolute, the estate may not be cut down
by subsequent words in the same instrument.3 3 The court
held that the deed conveyed a fee simple absolute and that
the restrictive words following the description of the property were ineffectual to cut down that estate.
The appellants contended that the above rule should not be
followed because it violated the clear intent of the grantor.
The court rejected this argument because of the principle
that the intention of the grantor will not be allowed to prevail
if it runs counter to an established rule of law.
It would certainly appear that the court did not address
itself to the principal issues that the facts of this case presented. One important question that should have been decided, but which was not considered by the court, was whether
or not the instrument here involved was a trust deed. No
mention of a trust was made by either party in the briefs or by
the court. If it might be assumed, however, that this was not
a trust deed, the question would certainly arise as to the
32. See infra note 37.

33. E.g., Groce v. Southern Ry., 164 S.C. 427, 162 S.E. 425 (1932).
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quantum of estate conveyed in the absence of the magic words
"their heirs and assigns." 34 It should be recognized that these
words were omitted and the words, "their successors and
assigns," were used instead. This would seem to create no
more than a life estate in the grantees. On the other hand,
if the instrument involved were considered a trust deed, as
would be suggested by McCown v. King,35 no such words
of inheritance would be necessary.
If the quantum of estate held to have been conveyed can
be justified, however, on the grounds that this is a trust
deed, 30 the practical implication of the court's decision striking the words of condition would be astounding. This decision would make it extremely difficult to create a fee simple
determinable.
It would seem that if this were in fact a trust deed it would
be very difficult to ignore the words which were used in an
attempt to create the defeasible fee. As is seen in the McCown
case, rules of law are not rigidly applied in trust deeds and
careful consideration is normallly given to the intention of
the grantor. In this case, from looking at the instrument as
the grantor intended to create some
a whole, it is clear that
3
7
fee.
defeasible
of
sort
It is hoped that this decision will not be taken as one
involving a trust deed. Assuming that it is not, the decision is well supported by South Carolina precedent holding
that subsequent words in a deed may not limit a fee simple
estate created in the granting clause. But, as previously in34. See Means, Words of Inheritancein Deeds of Land in South Carolina:
A Title Examiner's Guide, 5 S.C.L.Q. 313 (1953).

35. 23 S.C. 232 (1885).

36. The rule as stated in McCown v. King, 23 S.C. 232 (1885), is that if
it appears anywhere in the instrument that a trust is intended then that
trust will be given effect. Here it would seem from a close look at the deed
that a trust was intended. Since the property was conveyed to three individuals, apparently already acting as trustees of the school, to use for
school purposes and since the consideration was paid by these individuals
in their capacity as trustees, it would certainly seem that the grantor was
attempting to create a trust.
37. Not necessary to the decision of the case was the question of whether
a possibility of reverter or a right of entry would have been created had
the clause been given effect. For examples of the opposing views in South
Carolina see White v. Birtton, 75 S.C. 428, 56 S.E. 232 (1906), and Purvis
v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 106 S.E.2d 913 (1959). In the event that the
court had given effect to either a possibility of reverter or a right of entry,
these interests in land are usually considered inalienable by inter vivos
conveyance, and the defendant's interest in the property would be doubtful.
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dicated, the words of the granting clause were insufficient
to create a fee simple estate unless this were a trust deed.
Lane v. McEacher, 38 was a case involving a land grant
from King George II of Great Britain to James Bullock. The
land was situated along the Edisto River, which is a fresh
water navigable river, but is also tidal in that the water level
changes with the ebb and flow of the salt water tide in and
out of the mouth of the river. The disputed property was
situated between the high and low water marks of the river.
The land was described by the use of a plat which was attached to the grant, and it was stipulated that the land within
the distances and area 'shown on the plat included the property between the high and low water marks.
The defendant contended that under the rule of construction
set forth in Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co.,3 9 a grant, from a sovereign, of
land bounded by navigable waters passes title only to the
high water mark in the absence of some specific reference
to a "low water mark." The court rejected this argument
in the instant case because the plat was specific enough to
convey the property in dispute and there was no need to
resort to a rule of construction.
VI. JUDICIAL SALES

Cumbie v. Newberry40 involved the validity of a judicial
sale of a tract of land to a purchaser in good faith. In an
earlier action for the partition of this tract, the parties agreed
that the property be sold and the proceeds held until further
order of the court. The court issued a consent order for the
sale of the land with the normal proviso that if the original
successful bidder should fail to comply with the terms of his
bid within 10 days after the acceptance of the bid, the
property should be readvertised and resold on the same terms
at some subsequent day. The clerk of court was authorized
to execute a fee simple title to the purchaser when the
purchaser had complied with the terms of the sale. The first
successful bidder failed to comply, and in compliance with
the order, the clerk sold the property to the defendant.
38. 162 S.E.2d 174 (S.C. 1968).

39. 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928).
40. 159 S.E.2d 915 (S.C. 1968).
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In this action, the plaintiff asked to have the sale and
deed set aside on the grounds that he was given no personal
notice of the second sale and had no opportunity to be present
and protect his interest at the bidding.4 1 The court concluded
that the clerk had the authority to resell the property under
the order of sale without giving personal notice to the parties
and without a new order of the court. The court concluded
that public policy requires that the validity of judicial sales
be upheld when they reasonably can be. To support this principle the court cited the rule42 that a purchaser in good faith
at a judicial sale is not affected by irregularities in the sale,
but is required to ascertain only the jurisdiction of the court
and whether or not all proper parties were before the court
when the order was made. It would seem that the rights
of those who have an interest in the property would be adequately protected by this rule since they would have a much
better chance of keeping a close check on the proceedings
than would a prospective purchaser.

VII. MECHANIC'S LIENS
Guignard Brick Works v. Gantt 43 involved the question of
whether or not the plaintiff has a valid mechanic's lien on
the property of the defendant. Gantt had entered into a
contract with Van Builders for the construction of a house
on his property. Van entered into a contract with Guignard
for the supply of the necessary brick to be used. Guignard
sold and delivered 22,000 brick to Van, 6,700 of which Van
used in building the house. At this point Van abandoned the
contract, and Gantt proceeded with the construction using
the remaining 15,300 brick to complete the house. It appears
that Gantt knew before he completed the construction that
Van had not paid Guignard for the brick.
In this action Guignard attempted to establish a lien under
section 45-251 of the South Carolina Code 44 on the brick that
Gantt used after Van abandoned the contract. Essential to
41. The plaintiff was apparently displeased because one of the opposing
parties to the original action bought the property for $700 which was substantially less than the $1,100 bid at the first sale.
42. Bennett v. Floyd, 237 S.C. 64, 115 S.E.2d 659 (1960); Brownlee v.
Miller, 208 S.C. 252, 37 S.E.2d 658 (1946); Wingard v. Hennessee, 206

S.C. 159, 33 S.E.2d 390 (1945).

43. 159 S.E.2d 850 (S.C. 1968).

44. S.C. CODE; ANN. § 45-251 (1962).
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the existence of this lien was the fact that the materials were
supplied with the "consent of the owner." Guignard asserted
that the use of the brick by Gantt with knowledge that they
had not been paid for by Van constituted "consent of the
owner." The question appears to be one of novel impression
in this jurisdiction, but the court looked to applicable principles in past decisions. First, in Williamson v. Hotel Melrose45 it was stated that a party seeking to establish a statutory lien must bring himself fairly within the expressed intention of the lawmakers. If the material is not supplied with
the clear "consent of the owner" then the supplier would
certainly appear not to be within the expressed intent of
the legislators.
In Metz v. Critcher40 the facts were similar to those in
Guignard except that the builder did not abandon the contract. The court held that the supplier of lumber for the
house did not have a lien because the owner had no choice
as to who furnished the lumber; it was supplied with the
owner's knowledge but not with his express consent. The
court considered that the ability of the owner to choose was
essential to his giving consent and that the acts of Gantt
were insufficient to constitute consent on his part. Guignard
relied on Rapid Fireproof Door Co. v. Largo Corp.,4 7 in
which the court held that when title to the brick remained
in the seller, it was possible for him to establish a mechanic's
lien. The dicta of Rapid Fireproof, however, expressly supported the defendant's position in the case in which the plaintiff no longer had title to materials at the time the defendant
used them in the completion of the building.

VIII.

CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS

Kunkle v. South CarolinaElectric & Gas Co.48 involved an
action under section 10-2401 of the South Carolina Code 49
to determine the estate or title that passed under 1933 condemnation proceedings to the Lexington Water Power Company. It was stipulated that Lexington acquired either an
easement in the land or fee simple title thereto for the con45. 110 S.C. 1, 96 S.E. 407 (1918).
46. 86 S.C. 348, 68 S.E. 627 (1910).

47. 243 N.Y. 482, 154 N.E. 531 (1926).
48. 161 S.E.2d 163 (S.C. 1968).
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2401 (1962).
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struction and maintenance of a dam and reservoir on the
Saluda River.
The court assumed, for the purpose of this decision, that
Lexington had the authority to condemn the fee. As pointed
out in Atkinson v. CarolinaPower and Light Co.,50 however,
such authority is optional with the condemners, subject to
review by the courts. The court held that it was necessary
for the condemnation proceedings to show the interest sought
to be acquired in order that the landowners have adequate
notice of the extent of the taking. The landowners refused
to assent to the taking. Lexington therefore filed a petition
with the court to be allowed to proceed with the acquisition
of the property. The petition stated in part that the "lands
above described" were necessary for use in the construction
and maintenance of the dam and reservoir. Lexington was
allowed to proceed and the amount of compensation was fixed
by a jury. There was no specific notice that the fee was
being taken, and it appears that the only notice that was
given at all was that the "lands" were "required" as stated
in the petition.
The issue involved was whether or not notice that the
"land" was "required" constituted the necessary notice of
the condemnation of the fee. The court held that the term
"lands" did not constitute an unqualified notice that the
fee was being taken since "lands" may mean any interest
or estate in land, including an easement. For that reason
and the fact that an easement would adequately serve the
proposed use, Lexington acquired an easement in the property
rather than a fee simple.
JOHN C.B. SMITH, JR.

50. 239 S.C. 150, 121 S.E.2d 743 (1961).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss4/9

14

